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typically	 understood	 within	 the	 humanities	 departments	 of	 English-speaking	 universities	 is	
tremendously	affected	by	the	chains	of	transmission	via	which	philosophical	texts	come	to	be	deemed	
properly	 ‘theoretical’.1 	These	 processes	 of	 importation	 and	 propagation	 are	 never	 straightforward,	
involving	displacement,	 distortion,	 diffusion,	 and	 interference.	The	 channel	between	 ‘theory’	 and	 its	
sources	is	never	noiseless.	This	 is	particularly	noticeable	in	those	strands	of	theory	that	heavily	rely	
upon	 resources	 drawn	 from	 continental	 European	 traditions	 (e.g.	 phenomenology,	 psychoanalysis,	
critical	theory,	structuralism,	philosophy	of	technics	–	more	recently,	in	media	theory	specifically,	also	




context	 of	 English-language	 academia	 specifically,	 two	 things	 stand	 out	 to	 me:	 first,	 that	 the	 still-
untranslated	 status	 of	 his	 Hermes	 pentalogy	 (1968;	 1972;	 1974;	 1977;	 1980)	 has	 led	 to	 this	



















































becomes	 a	 ‘a	 wandering	 and	 almost	 omnipresent	 subject,	 granted	 the	 status	 of	 interceptor:	 an	
interceptor	of	communication,	of	messages	circulating	through	theoretical,	global,	and	intersubjective	
networks’	(HII:	141).	




references,	 and	 thus	 impossible	 to	master	 from	 any	 single	 point	 of	 view.6	The	 epistemologist	 finds	
themselves	 caught	 indeterminately	 between	 two	distinct	 but	 complementary	 tasks:	 to	 know	and	 to	




















straightaway	 emerges	 as	 a	 distribution	 of	 points	 of	 view	 across	 the	 system;	 finally,	 a	 philosophy	 of	
communication	must	inevitably	be	established	that	expresses	the	encyclopaedia	and	that	is	–	given	that	it	
expresses	 the	 world	 such	 as	 it	 is,	 such	 as	 the	 sciences	 read	 it	 and	 institute	 it	 –	 a	 philosophy	 of	
communication	without	substance,	i.e.	without	fixity	or	reference	(HII:	13).	
	
























Serres	builds	 upon	 Bachelard’s	 ‘non-Cartesian’	 epistemology,	which,	 like	 the	 sciences	 from	which	 it	
draws	its	inspiration,	 ‘tries	to	read	the	real	complexity	of	things	beneath	the	simple	appearance’	and	
‘seeks	diversity	beneath	identity	and	tries	to	go	beyond	superficial	and	summary	views’	(1984:	139).	
But	 for	 the	 former,	 we	 need	 to	 go	 beyond	 this,	 accounting	 for	 an	 ever-growing	 and	 shifting	 field	
composed	of	manifold	elements	and	links	in	constant	interaction,	a	system	wherein	various	sciences	
continually		converge	and	diverge	in	novel	fashions,	to	the	extent	that	one	will	never	be	able	to	totalize	
this	 field	 from	 a	 single	 perspective:	 ‘crossed	 coordination,	 intersection,	 and	 application	 become	





[f]or	 a	 given	 point,	 I	 can	 draw	 the	 connection	 node,	 the	 product,	 and	 the	 schema	 of	 intersection:	














achieved	 by	 circulation,	 translation,	 and	 correspondence	 between	 these	 increasingly	 mobile	 and	
permeable	regions.	‘[I]ntersection	is	heuristic,	and	progress	is	interwoven’		(HII:	13).	




is	unilinear,	premised	upon	a	univocal	 transmission	of	content	 through	a	single,	 simple	channel,	 the	
network	is	‘characterized	by	a	plurality	and	complexity	of	the	channels	of	mediation"	(HI:	12);	b)	instead	
of	 a	 univocal	 opposition	 between	 terms,	 one	 finds	 in	 the	 network	 a	 ‘differentiation	 of	 types	 and	
quantities	of	determination’,	allowing	for	a	pluri-determination	of	vertices	(HI:	14);	c)	an	equipotency	
cannot	 be	 posited	 between	 these	 various	 lines	 of	 determination,	 producing	 ‘a	 complicated	 and	
constantly	changing	set	representing	an	unstable	situation	of	power	carefully	distributing	its	arms	or	
arguments	in	an	irregularly-meshed	space’	(HI:	15);	d)	the	‘pluralist	differentiation	and	irregularity	of	












eludes	 other	 methods	 of	 representation;	 and	 lastly,	 f)	 the	 plurality	 of	 connections	 from	which	 the	






























formal	 purity	 (i.e.	 its	 total	 lack	 of	 determinate	 content),	 allow	 him	 to	 avoid	 the	 accusation	 of	 still	
elevating	 a	 particular	 discipline	 to	 the	 status	 of	 a	 domineering	 queen-science. 10 	Whereas	 classical	
































more	 sharply.	 Now	 phenomena	 must	 be	 selected,	 filtered,	 purified,	 and	 cast	 in	 the	 mould	 of	 the	
instruments	 used;	 produced	 in	 accordance	with	 their	 plan.	 And	 instruments	 are	 nothing	 but	 theories	









when	 viewed	 from	 a	 historical	 lens.	Which	might	 seem	 a	 slightly	 surprising	 claim,	 given	 what	 has	

















truth.	 The	 same	 is	 true	 of	 ‘perspectival’	 space,	 which	 can	 only	 appear	 to	 us	 as	 that	 of	 painters	 and	










	 Latour’s	need	 to	warn	 that	his	usage	of	 the	 term	network	must	not	be	conflated	with	 its	various	
empirical	applications	might	suggest	to	us	that	this	concept	has	well	and	truly	lost	its	appearance	of	
formal	purity.	In	the	same	way	that	information	theory	–	which,	for	Serres,	possesses	a	multivalence	
that	 has	 allowed	 it	 to	 be	 imported	 into	 many	 different	 disciplines,	 in	 line	 with	 its	 universalist	
pretensions	–	is	likely	to	seem	to	us	today	as	singularly	and	rather	blatantly	wedded	to	the	problems	of	
telecommunications	and	electrical	engineering	from	which	it	arose,	no	longer	able	to	be	posited	as	a	
general	 theory	of	communication,	 the	 image	of	 the	network,	as	ubiquitous	 as	 it	 is,	 is	 likely	 to	 evoke	






even	 the	 increasingly	common	parlance	of	 ‘networking’	as	a	social	activity)	 that	immediately	call	 its	
abstraction	into	question.	













	 Use	 of	 the	 network	 concept	 and	 form	 is	 more	 prevalent	 now	 than	 ever	 –	 including	 within	 the	
everyday	 vernacular,	 far	 removed	 from	 its	 provenance	 in	 mathematics	 and	 engineering.	 But	 this	
ubiquity	helps	highlight	its	inadequacies	as	a	mode	of	figuration.	In	any	case,	the	universalism	for	which	
Serres	 advocates	 in	 regard	 to	network	 topology,	 information	 theory,	 set	 theory,	 or	 any	of	 his	 other	
privileged	formalisms	–	a	universalism	based	upon	formal	purity	and	generality	–	will	probably	strike	
the	 reader	 today	 as	 somewhat	 implausible,	 not	 only	 because	 of	 the	 preponderate	 distaste	 for	 such	
sweeping	 claims	 in	 contemporary	 scholarship,	 but	 because	 these	models	 simply	 no	 longer	 give	 the	
impression	of	being	as	pure	or	as	general	as	 they	once	did.12	But	of	course,	Serres	himself	would	no	
doubt	recognize	this.	His	universalism,	such	as	it	is	posited,	is	only	ever	provisional,	precisely	for	the	
reason	that	 the	 formalism	of	any	model	will	decay	over	 time,	as	 the	forward	march	of	mathematical	







27).	By	 the	 time	of	the	 final	 two	(Distribution,	1977	and	The	Northwest	Passage,	1980,	respectively),	
however,	 he	 is	 far	 more	 sceptical	 regarding	 its	 epistemological	 adequacy.	 To	 return	 to	 the	 things	




means	 understanding	 that	 ‘[a]ll	 our	 partitions	 and	 all	 our	 divisions,	 our	 differences,	 chains,	 series;	
sequences,	consequences,	 systems,	orders,	 and	 formations,	hierarchies	 and	archés’	 (HIV:	40)	are	 the	
arbitrary	products	of	deliberate	choices,	which	are	in	turn	fundamentally	acts	of	power.	And	ultimately,	
it	means	mixing,	melting,	and	dissolving	these	structures,	‘returning	to	the	things	themselves	all	their	
rights	 prior	 to	 our	 intervening’	 (HIV:	 40).	 He	 appeals	 to	 a	 dispersive	 distribution	 that	 precedes	
combinatorics,	 sets,	 orders,	 signals,	 and	 any	 other	 kind	 of	 structuration	 or	 definition.	 Not	 the	
distribution	of	specific	messages,	but	the	noise	from	which	all	such	messages	contingently	arise.13	
	 The	aforementioned	figure	of	the	cloud	becomes	one	of	his	preferred	images	for	evoking	a	‘chaos,	
disorder,	 and	background	noise	 the	 complexity	of	which	 far	 exceeds	 the	 competence	 of	 established	
networks’	(HV:	64),	the	indistinct	borders	of	which	stand	in	contrast	to	the	smooth,	distinct	lines	of	the	













an	 anomaly,	 a	 ‘precise,	 exact,	 clear-cut,	 rigorous,	 acute,	 distinct	 island’	 (HIV:	 11)	 that	momentarily	
appears	 within	 an	 indifferentiable	 ocean.	 Epistemology	 must	 turn	 its	 attention	 toward	 fluctuation,	
turbulence,	noise,	 stochastic	processes,	 fuzzy	sets,	 and	so	on	and	 so	 forth.	 ‘Our	networks	 are	 locally	
immersed	in	clouds,	our	structures	in	distributions,	like	archipelagos	in	the	sea’	(HV:	64).		
	 This	 gesture	 toward	 a	 tumultuous,	 protean	 reality,	 unable	 to	 be	 squished	 into	 the	 moulds	 of	












its	multiscalar	 intricacy,	 unfathomable	 density,	 and	 unavoidable	 entanglement	with	 our	 lifeworld	 –	
demands	such	an	 approach.14	We	need	a	media	 theory	adequate	 to	 this	complexity	 (or	which,	more	
realistically,	 at	 least	 aims	 toward	 such	 adequation),	 and	 this	 in	 turn	 means	 a	 media	 theory	 that	
interrogates	 its	 own	 theorization,	 reflecting	 upon	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 is	 itself	 tied	 up	 with	 this	









’Media	 theory,’	 observe	 Scott	Wark	 and	McKenzie	Wark,	 is	 today	 ‘mediated	 by	 the	 platform,	which	
presents	 us	 with	 readymade	 conceptualizations	 that	 we	 uncritically	 incorporate	 into	 our	 theories’	
(2019:	310).	This	is	one	of	the	hurdles	such	theory	constantly	encounters:	we	unceasingly	utilize	the	
media	technologies	that	we	purport	to	analyse,	our	quotidian	experience	is	saturated	by	them,	with	the	




so	on.	This	 is	 the	hurdle	Plato	 confronted	 in	 the	Phaedrus,	 two	and	a	half	millennia	 ago,	 and	 it	 still	
persists,	in	a	greatly	intensified	form,	today.16	Instead	of	just	tritely	signalling	adherence	to	the	standard	


















with	which	 Serres	principally	 concerns	himself	 in	 the	Hermes	books:	 it	makes	 little	 claim	 to	 formal	
purity;	it	does	not	in	any	way	follow	the	scientific	method;	and	it	does	not	evince	the	kind	of	historical	
‘progress’,	however	 aleatory,	 that	 Serres	views	as	 central	 to	such	 sciences,	even	 if	 it	does	obviously	
demonstrate	a	historical	progression	(in	the	non-teleological	sense	of	the	word).	Indeed,	much	of	the	
‘progress’	media	theory	makes,	if	we	can	still	refer	to	such	a	thing,	is	mostly	down	to	the	rapid	pace	of	
technological	 development,	 and	 the	 new	 devices,	 platforms,	 and	 forms	 of	 content	 unremittingly	
introduced	–	an	uneasy	relationship,	if	there	ever	were	one.	
	 By	 the	 same	 token	 though,	 one	 of	 the	 virtues	 of	 media	 theory	 is	 that	 it	 tends	 to	 at	 least	 tacitly	
recognize	the	extent	to	which	its	concepts	are	empirically,	materially,	and	technically	conditioned	(i.e.	
mediated).	This	fact	is	hard	to	avoid,	since	media	theoretical	concepts	are	typically	tied	to	the	media	in	




and	 communications	 studies	 are	 being	 increasingly	 drawn	 toward	 scientistic	 qualitative	 and	
quantitative	methods	of	research	–	which	do,	in	many	cases,	aspire	to	a	certain	formalism	–	that	we	do	
not	 occlude	 this	 empirical	 residuum.	 Serres’	 Hermes	 pentalogy	 supplies	 a	 powerful,	 if	 enigmatic,	
corrective	to	uncritical	positivism	in	its	many	guises,	reminding	us	of	the	need	to	maintain	reflexivity	
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